Question Worth Asking!
Why have our governments and political leaders allowed central banks to dictate the future economic path of sovereign nations, especially when banks and bankers are knowingly guilty of fraud, economic tyranny, theft on a colossal scale, Ponzi schemes, monetary embezzlement, insurrection and war, price fixing and interest rate manipulation, undermining commodity markets and most recently, have been found money laundering billions of dollars for the drug cartels?
All the laws that have been legislated to protect humanity from the so-called “war on terror” and unleash an “unorthodox security” are the by-product of economic and political tyranny. The only government that will ultimately make a difference is the one that will completely nationalize the banking system and eliminate all central banks. There only purpose is to create debt, unprecedented taxation and nurture power among a very few people.
You should also be asking how non-elected political leaders, whose ties to central banks, become political leaders.
Finally, we must measure the impact of the establishment societies on political decision-making. I make reference to the Bilderberg, Rothschild Banking, Trilateral Commission, CFR, Fabian Society, Rockefeller Foundation, Council of Rome and many more masonic havens. These so-called “think tanks” are where bankers and political leaders are covertly advised on how to unleash mind-numbing social and economic policy. They are ultimately the minions of the long established papacies and monarchies.
It is wise to revisit Machiavelli, Cromwell, Orwell, Huxley and the least known William Cooper. In their words and actions the truth will unveil itself. Money has become the means by whch we create and define political borders, and it does determine who lives and dies. Why?
I have attached the last half of a Speech made by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London - 26 July 2012
Full speech can be read at the following link:
But there is another message I want to tell you.
Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.
There are some short-term challenges, to say the least. The short-term challenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken place in the euro area. Investors retreated within their national boundaries. The interbank market is not functioning. It is only functioning very little within each country by the way, but it is certainly not functioning across countries.
And I think the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation.
There are at least two dimensions to this. The interbank market is not functioning, because for any bank in the world the current liquidity regulations make - to lend to other banks or borrow from other banks - a money losing proposition. So the first reason is that regulation has to be recalibrated completely.
The second point is in a sense a collective action problem: because national supervisors, looking at the crisis, have asked their banks, the banks under their supervision, to withdraw their activities within national boundaries. And they ring fenced liquidity positions so liquidity can’t flow, even across the same holding group because the financial sector supervisors are saying “no”.
So even though each one of them may be right, collectively they have been wrong. And this situation will have to be overcome of course.
And then there is a risk aversion factor. Risk aversion has to do with counterparty risk. Now to the extent that I think my counterparty is going to default, I am not going to lend to this counterparty. But it can be because it is short of funding. And I think we took care of that with the two big LTROs where we injected half a trillion of net liquidity into the euro area banks. We took care of that.
Then you have the counterparty recess related to the perception that my counterparty can fail because of lack of capital. We can do little about that.
Then there’s another dimension to this that has to do with the premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings. These premia have to do, as I said, with default, with liquidity, but they also have to do more and more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility. Now to the extent that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my counterparty - they come into our mandate. They come within our remit.
To the extent that the size of these sovereign premia hampers the functioning of the monetary policy transmission channel, they come within our mandate.
So we have to cope with this financial fragmentation addressing these issues.
I think I will stop here; I think my assessment was candid and frank enough.