Goldman Sachs Makes $255 Million Storing 3% of Global Aluminum Production
The murky yarn about Goldman Sachs’ 27 aluminum storage
units in Detroit boils down to some very simple dollars and cents. A
respectable source informed me this morning that Goldman charges 48
cents a day for
each ton of aluminum it stores. As it has presently 1.5 million tons, or
a measly 3% of global production, in its warehouses and there are 365
days to a year, by my figuring Goldman’s annual revenues purely from
storing the aluminum total about $255 million
before expenses. And I’ve got a feeling those drivers in Detroit are not
exactly getting paid the old Teamsters wages per hour.
So, I can’t exactly understand why the CFTC, Sen. Carl
Levin, the New York Times and the Financial Times op-ed page will be
able to convince the Federal Reserve that this rather banal storage
story amounts to
a manipulation of aluminum prices in Goldman Sachs’ favor and against
the interests of the can manufacturers, beer and soda companies and
consumer prices. After all, Goldman presently has under storage 1.5
million tons of aluminum, which happens to be a measly
3% of total world aluminum production in 2012 of some 48 million tons.
It would have to be a very sharply formed strategy that turned 3% of
world aluminum supply into a price manipulation crime. In fact, the
point is Goldman is a very minor player in the aluminum
market. Minor as in 3%.
What’s more, the users of aluminum are putting it in
storage because they don’t need it at the moment, as the price of
aluminum has fallen by 40%, a rather seriously bearish matter. If they
suddenly need the
metal they would have to go to the aluminum spot market, say on the LME
(London Metals Exchange), and buy it from a major producer. As well,
there is a proposal pending for metal depositors to be able to remove
6000 tons of aluminum, double the 3000 tons available
for removal each day now. It’s fascinating the way alleged manipulation
can lead to plans for increasing supply to meet demand.
Yes, there are troubling parts to the story. Goldman
admits a percentage of the aluminum is being stored by financial
interests like speculators, traders and hedge funds, who have been
kicked in the chops by
the sharp decline in the value of their aluminum during the general
decline in most commodity prices. But, Goldman, protecting itself and
its powerful trading clientele, won’t reveal how much the traders own
versus the industrial interests. It must mean the
hedge funds are the biggies.
Nor can I understand why it requires a year’s time for those storing their aluminum to have it
delivered to them. Apparently, it’s an archaic system whereby a depositor today must enter a queue, which at present rates of delivery, would require more than a year to actually get return delivery of your aluminum. This immense delay just doesn’t make any sense to me at all in this modern age of fork-lift trucks and the like. Naturally, it appears to me that the proposal to suddenly make double the amount of aluminum available smacks of rushing to put out the fire before the $255 million in fees totally disappears.
delivered to them. Apparently, it’s an archaic system whereby a depositor today must enter a queue, which at present rates of delivery, would require more than a year to actually get return delivery of your aluminum. This immense delay just doesn’t make any sense to me at all in this modern age of fork-lift trucks and the like. Naturally, it appears to me that the proposal to suddenly make double the amount of aluminum available smacks of rushing to put out the fire before the $255 million in fees totally disappears.
I’m aghast at the scare scenarios postulated by the FT
today, first alleging that an accident at a coal mine Goldman took over
in the Latin American nation of Colombia mind you, when it became a
distressed property,
could trigger such a “crisis of confidence” as to endanger one of the
too-big-to fail institutions. I guess the FT means Goldman itself. Seems
a little excessively alarming to me when we really should be worried
about the shortage of collateral backing the
fundamental financial underpins of the system as well as the
non-transparent bilateral derivatives trades that use an impossible to
determine leverage. Even more ridiculous is the FT supposition that
dealing in metals and storage can be compared to the cascading
avalanche of losses in sub-prime mortgages during 2008.
And shame on the New York Times for making it appear that
Goldman Sachs was moving vast amounts of aluminum around Detroit from
warehouse to warehouse as a way to keep it off the market and push
aluminum prices
higher. The truth is less scandalous. As the price of aluminum has been
in a bear market the users have decided to move it to non-LME warehouses
in order to benefit from lower rents and as well not be subject to LME
rules. That bears a bit more investigation.To
repeat another crucial factor; GS and its clients are limited to
removing no more than 3000 tons of aluminum from the warehouses to
supply the market according to the rules and regulations of the London
Metals Exchange, according to Goldman Sachs. By the way,
just how many trucks does it take to move 3000 tons of aluminum ingots.
Think about 3000 tons a day. That’s a powerful lot of aluminum.
Hopefully we’ll get a more precise explanation of these internal
mechanicsw of the aluminum storage business when the hearings
begin.
Source: http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/07/25/goldman-sachs-makes-255-million-storing-3-of-global-aluminum-production/
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